more broadly than to the subset of warfare that the addition of the word 'counterinsurgency' seemed to suggest. It is true that his work was inspired by imperial experiences and reflected those aspects of warfare that the French had faced in the 1950s: terrorism, clandestine organisations, guerrilla operations. Nevertheless, the operational approach that he advocated was framed within a certain concept of war, the nature of which, he believed, had been permanently
altered. The subtitle should not obscure this: Trinquier thought that he was talking about modern warfare, not simply counterinsurgency. ' We still persist,' he wrote 'in studying a type of warfare that no longer exists and that we shall never fight again, while we pay only passing attention to the war we lost in Indochina and the one we are about to lose in Algeria.' Trinquier's point was not that all wars were now colonial, but that these colonial wars had unmasked the true nature of modern warfare. This warfare, without fronts or pitched battles, would be 'subversive' or 'revolutionary':
Warfare is now an interlocking system of actions -political, economic, psychological, military -that aims at the overthrow of the established authority in a country and its replacement by another regime. To achieve this end, the aggressor tries to exploit the internal tensions of the country attacked -ideological, social, religious economic -any conflict liable to have a profound influence on the population to be conquered. Moreover, in view of the present-day interdependence of nations, any residual grievance within a population, no matter how localized and lacking in scope, will surely be brought by determined adversaries into the framework of the great world conflict. From a localized conflict of secondary origin and importance, they will always attempt sooner or later to bring about a generalized conflict. 3 This essay focuses on the war that the French revolutionary war theorists thought that they were fighting: the modern war of which the colonial aspect was but one part. In so doing, it argues that the theorists of the 1950s considered their fight as a total war, considers the parameters of their concept of totality, and suggests that the roots of this tendency to think in total terms lay less in the colonial sphere than the metropolitan sphere. 'Total War' is a notoriously slippery concept. As Roger Chickering has observed, the idea of 'Total War' has meant different things to different people, even amongst belligerents involved in wars generally considered to have been 'total.' 4 Far from ascribing to the more generally accepted metanarrative of the expansion of total war culminating in the global conflict that spanned the years 1939 to 1945, the total war that the revolutionary war theorists described rested on a belief about the scale of a global subversive war which they contended had been underway since 1917, and for which France's post-1945 colonial wars were the most tangible evidence. Given the stakes of such a conflict for the Western world, the theorists were beholden to an escalatory logic which suggested that only greater levels of popular support and mobilisation and more ruthless methods of pursuing the fight would guarantee the security not just of the Empire, but of France herself.
In this manner, owing to their capacity to rationalise and unify their experiences in colonial wars, the revolutionary war theorists forged a link between security abroad and security at home which stood in marked contrast to the experiences of the British Army, whose analogous conflicts in Asia and Africa were not subject to a similar process. 5 This was in part a reflection of the stakes and scale of the wars in Indochina and Algeria. Unlike other conflicts of decolonization, the wars in Indochina and Algeria pulled in hundreds of thousands, rather than tens of thousands of combatants. The Algerian War, moreover, involved the use of French national servicemen from 1956 onward, so that by the war's end over a million conscripts had seen service there. 6 Algeria's unique status, enshrined in the 1875 constitution of Third Republic, as a legal part of French sovereign territory, helped make this possible. 7 It also played a role in facilitating a particularly shocking dynamic of violence. In the words of Martin Thomas, 'The Algerian War was longer, bigger and nastier than anything in the British experience.' 8 For soldiers such as Trinquier, the experience of Algeria compounded that of Indochina. They became 'centurions', a reference to Jean Lartéguy's popular 1960 novel of the same name and a soubriquet for 'the hard-bitten French regular who had survived the Indochina war, had learned his Mao Tse-tung the hard way, and later had sought to apply his lessons in Algeria or even in mainland France.' 9 In the minds of the revolutionary war theorists, these conflicts only served to lay bare how misguided the blinkered focus on atomic rivalry really was. The process of intellectual totalization to which they succumbed, meanwhile, played a role in radicalizing the French Army during the Algerian War, producing an institution willing to employ torture as a military expedient, and willing even to take France to the brink of civil war.
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French revolutionary war theory has not been subject to exhaustive scrutiny since its demise with the end of the Algerian War of independence, especially in the English language. The most concentrated period of attention came in the immediate aftermath of the Algerian War, during which time several tomes emerged. Foremost amongst these was Peter Paret's excellent and concise analysis, which built upon two insightful journal articles published during the war itself, very shortly after the theory had reached peak influence. As Lacheroy saw it, Viet Minh success was predicated on the ability to assume control of the population in both body and spirit. This approach was guided by the notion that there was no such thing as a free individual. Instead, human beings could be divided into three categories:
militaire, fonctionnaire, or member of a state association. For the militaire or fonctionnaire loyalty was not an issue since the individual would at all times be under the eye of the party, or of comrades only too willing to denounce one another for the slightest failing. The civil population, meanwhile, could be bound to the party from the cradle to the grave through five basic state associations -masculine youth, feminine youth, old persons, peasants and non-peasants. This was the basis of the first of the parallel hierarchies: a hierarchy of associations which sought to group individuals according to their sex, age, tastes, needs, and which operated up the levels from the village, through the canton, sub-prefecture and prefecture, to the state, with a general staff at each level directing those below and receiving orders from those above. To this hierarchy of associations was added a territorial hierarchy corresponding more with traditional social organisation, again operating at all levels from the village, through canton, sub-prefecture and so on. In contrast to Western territorial organisation, however, Lacheroy argued that the Vietminh system substituted collective for individual responsibility, enforced at all levels by responsables for different areas -effectives, intendance, youth, propaganda -in a manner which loosely mirrored the French army's first, second, and third bureaux responsibilities. In other words, in the first case, one has taken the people overall: the man in his family, the family in its group of houses, the group of houses in its village. In the second case, one redistributes the people differently: one distributes them by individual; one considers them as a man or women of a certain age and of a certain level or of a certain milieu. This relative homogeneity amongst associations makes them receptive to similar propaganda. From this base, Lacheroy developed a general schema for how a revolutionary war unfurled, adopting a five phase process which he dubbed a scénario-type de guerre révolutionnaire, and which progressed as follows. In the first phase a problem is created through shocking and random acts of violence: bomb blasts and assassinations. The unexplained nature of these acts cause great confusion, and their impact is amplified worldwide by press agencies and radio broadcasts. In the next phase a recognisable agenda begins to take shape, as assassinations are carried out against individuals labelled 'traitors' to the rebel cause. Low-level individuals are purposefully targeted, to make clear to the average person that they too might become a future target: 'the murders of a general, a caïd, a bachaga or a prefect, would not affect the population, whereas the assassination of a park warden concerns them enormously, because tomorrow, or the day after, it could be the turn of anyone.' This phase then culminates in what Lacheroy terms 'the battle for the complicity of silence', as police action becomes increasingly ineffective in the face of a population unwilling to comply with investigations for fear they might be next. From this point, the third phase arrives. Here, the revolutionary war moves to a higher stage, encompassing both a civil and military aspect. In military terms, the first armed elements are created, although they appear little different from the regular population: 'It will be a soldier on the street corner, a soldier in the village, a little guérillero, who will be able to act easily because no-one will denounce him.'
Likewise in the civil sphere, the political commissars of the revolutionary force now begin to operate on the population in an effort to transform their passivity into activity. In the fourth 1958) . Bonnet trawled through irregular conflicts since antiquity, in part to demonstrate that whilst the fundamentals of guerrilla warfare had often been addressed, 'la stratégie traditionnelle prête encore une attention insuffisante à l'aspect psychologique de la guerre révolutionnaire.' In his work on the Vendée, Montagnon argued that 'si ce que nous appelons l'action psychologique n'atteignit pas en Vendée l'intensité que nous lui connaissons aujourd'hui, faute de disposer de nos moyens modernes d'expression, elle ne fut cependant pas absente de la lutte.' Chalmin was equally keen to stress that 'il n'y a rien de neuf sous le soleil et le passé a déjà connu des guerres révolutionnaires', in making the case for a contemporary parallel with the war prosecuted by the French revolutionaries against Austria. His article was based on a presentation given to stagiaires at the consent to transformations and sacrifices indispensable to our security, and to forge the new tactics which will bring victory.
This revolution in the art of war went hand in hand with a particular concept of the revolutionary war, which had to be understood at a higher level than individual 'subversive' or 'insurrectional' conflicts. This was 'the war of the revolution for the conquest of the world […] directed against all foreign forces, whether they resist or whether they want to remain neutral.'
The forms of this revolutionary war differed according to the demands of communist strategy, which explained the manner in which 'hot revolutionary wars', which flared constantly 'here and there around the globe', made up 'the revolutionary war.' 39 Thus, an understanding of modern warfare which attempted binary distinctions missed the point:
It is useless to oppose the terms "revolutionary war" and "classic war" (atomic or not), to talk of "subversive" or "insurrectional" war in terms of current conflicts.
"The revolutionary war" has begun. It has its mechanism and its own rules, even if it takes on, locally, episodically, such as in Korea, an aspect of conventional operations, even if it becomes a third world conflict one day. Its mechanism, its rules are sufficiently new and efficient so that there may be, in addition to the "war of the revolution", a "revolution in the art of war" which is manifest in the conduct of all the current local revolutionary wars.
40
Two years later, the problem of how to understand the revolutionary war was still uppermost in Nothing to learn on the strategic level, for you will be dealing with a strategy of ants which is completely outmoded in modern wars. Nothing to learn on the tactical level, for you will be dealing with out-of-date tactics, which have more in common with the wars of '70 and '14-18, than that of '39-45, itself already so outdated.
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In reality it was such metropolitan-minded thinking which was outmoded: conflicts in the colonies held the key to contemporary and future war. No, don't worry, we will betray nothing at all. There will always be war. But we, because we are communists, because we are used to this regime and its formulas, because we have a considerable lead in this domain, we know how to conduct a war which will always be below the level of generalized war, below the level of the atomic bomb. We will pull the strings: we know how to do it. We will do it through 48 Ibid, 308. That this could be so relied upon the belief that the processes which led to the loss of control in
Indochina could be applied anywhere: the global enemy who had built 'bases' in the coloniesregions in which the population had been conquered in body and mind, and where the revolutionary enjoyed complete freedom of action -could do the same in the métropole. In this manner, it was possible to see the same loss of control to revolutionary forces unfurling globally:
The "revolutionary war" is thus triggered the whole world over. Russia, China and certain satellites are already secure "bases" and numerous countries are in the process of "rotting" (pourissement), whilst the U.S.A. and perhaps Great Britain 'because they used their profound knowledge of the psychology and the structure of Vietnamese society, mobilised in a total war.' 58 From this blueprint, Némo was able to argue for a concept of war which was, on one level, population-centric: this 'war "amongst the crowd" makes of this crowd and its opinion the true stake.' Yet this was a conception couched within the language of totality. As a consequence of the population being the stake, it was: 'Illusory to want to find, for the complex problems that present themselves, a simple solution; it is neither political nor military; it must be total, and current vocabulary can find no other word to qualify it.' 59 'Total'
was not just a recognition of the means by which the Viet Minh had achieved politico-military mobilization; it was also a prescription for how any such war had to be fought. One and the other say to each other these are the processes specific to "colonial" wars and retain for war, "real" war, that which takes place in the métropole or in Europe, the ideas that they have learnt to consider as sacrosanct.
There is thus an opposition between forecast and fact. Why not admit that what happened in Indochina, what is happening in North Africa could happen in Europe?
It is quicker to deal with a difficult problem than to deny it! In reality, we find ourselves in the presence of two crucial phenomena: the development of atomic and nuclear weapons on one hand, the intensification of ideological conflicts and their use for clearly "operational" ends on the other. It would be just as dangerous to deny one as to minimise the other. Tomorrow's war must be expected to use both in combination.
60
What Némo was proposing was, he claimed, a 'new geometry of warfare' which blurred the boundaries between nuclear and guerrilla, regular and irregular, métropole and colony.
Understanding this new geometry would prove crucial in facing up to a future war of an intensely ideological character:
Appealing to all human resources, mobilising all energies, not by virtue of an order issued by a government authority but by the will of the individuals themselves to work for the triumph of a cause, employing weapons of great power and considerable scope, it deserves without doubt the label of "total war" or "global war." The dominant fact remains that the war will take place in the crowd, amongst the populations which, instead of being, as in the past, simple reservoirs of soldiers and labour and at the same time possible victims of blows, will participate effectively in operations, under a new form. It is the population that would be mobilised using Given the urgency with which they felt the revolutionary war encroaching upon home soil, it is perhaps unsurprising that such writers were averse to half-measures in dealing with the revolutionary threat. Hogard, for instance, was adamant that negotiation was no solution. The revolutionaries held no thoughts of 'partial victory', seeking power for themselves only and the exclusion of all opposition. As such:
If we deal with relatively moderate personalities, they are quickly 'purified'; if we listen to the real chiefs of the movement, they envisage negotiation only as a means to increase their prestige and their influence over the populations, and to discourage our troops and our friends.
[…] Negotiation thus accelerates the process of the revolutionary war; and allows the rebels to trigger the general counter-offensive much more quickly.
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The only solution was to adopt an uncompromisingly offensive posture. This meant eschewing more economic-based efforts aimed at the gentle persuasion of communities. Thus Chassin warned against the huge Western error in thinking that the first necessity was to fill men's' stomachs. Rather, he argued 'it is the heart which must be filled first. If we want men to give their lives, something other than beefsteak or refrigerators must be offered to them. Appeal must be made to their deep feelings and a goal given to them to reach which seems grand and just.' to be influenced. Lacheroy's assertion in the first phase of his scénario-type de guerre révolutionnaire that 'in the beginning, there is nothing' was indicative of the manner in which the theorists heaped their attention on 'methods and techniques, to the detriment of a study of the political, sociological, and economic terrain in which they are employed.' 65 People were pawns, and ideology a scientific instrument in a war of manipulation.
Such radical remedies served to underline how far the advocates of the modern war felt that the techniques of the old colonial conflicts were insufficient for confronting the war in progress.
When used in France's wars of decolonization, even where a degree of success had been of the master practitioners, Hubert Lyautey. 66 In fact, a number of his practices, such as the creation of groupes mobiles for rapid action, coupled with the establishment of a 'de Lattre line' of blockhouses and forts for the defence of the Red River delta, were strikingly reminiscent of the practice of Lyautey's own mentor, Joseph Gallieni, in Tonkin six decades previously. 67 De practices. Indeed, Porch goes so far as to suggest that 'Operation Castor was nothing less than an updated oil spot -that is, the gradual expansion of a zone of pacification out of a secure base area through co-ordinated military, intelligence-gathering, economic, and political methods.'
69
The adoption of quadrillage in the Algerian countryside later that decade, a combination of gridmarking and designated patrolling, coupled with mass resettlement, bore the hallmarks of an earlier age, albeit on a grander scale. 70 Similarly, Craddock and Smith suggest that General Jacques Massu's "surface method" adopted during the urban Battle of Algiers in 1956-7
represented 'merely an extension of the standard pacification approach in the rest of Algeria […] the quadrillage (squaring) system that involved the establishment of manned posts at 200 sensitive points across the city and 180 daily patrols of six men each.' 71 Nevertheless, urban quadrillage was an adjunct effort to the wider army attempt to mould the principles of guerre révolutionnaire to an urban setting, while rural quadrillage can be seen as part of a 'very reactive and dispersed strategy against the ALN' which would only be remedied under the Challe Plan of 1959.
72
On the ground, the old colonial methods could achieve a degree of geographical consolidation and impose a temporary order, but they were unable to fully confront the challenges posed by the new warfare -a contention reflected in the gradual reorganization of the curriculum of the CIPCG at Arzew away from tactical and towards psychological instruction. 73 Given the emphasis placed by theorists on the novelty of modern war, this is perhaps unsurprising. 74 At the same time, the French theorists of the 1950s also owed certain debts to pre-1939 currents of militarypolitical thought which help explain their post-1945 path to totality, although these currents were more metropolitan than colonial. have a de-escalatory effect on armed conflict so that 'we will be able in the future to witness relatively important military conflicts, conducted with both sides careful to engage only limited effectives.' He even harboured the hope that 'if passion or destiny leads to the outbreak of a total war and that the military resolution seems uncertain or far-off, it will transform itself into a measured war, with limited military and political objectives. 87 This optimistic prognosis was swiftly dashed by subsequent events. Several decades later, however, Beaufre was able to present the concept as a valid prediction of 'the pattern of the cold war' in which war was 'total […] in other words it will be carried on in all fields, political, economic, diplomatic and military.' His resolution was that 'equally therefore strategy must be total.' 88 Indeed, where Beaufre was most consistent, in the 1960s as in the 1930s, was in his emphasis on the enlarged dimensions of strategy. The paix-guerre might be instrumental in ushering in a new era of limited wars, but such conflicts would have to be conducted within much wider strategic parameters. To put it another way, these limited wars consisted within a total strategy which could no longer be confined to military operations:
Since war engages all domains, strategy must embrace the game fully, as much to guide the choice of factors to be used as to bind the various elements of manoeuvre to each other. This total strategy, as we can call it, is not only necessary for the direction of total war, but also for the conduct of the new war, of a form so insidious and diverse that we have been able to believe that it was nothing but a deceptive aspect of peace. 'total' and 'permanent' in a more immediate sense, meaning that the government now had a duty to put psychological warfare into practice for its own ends, and as part of its daily routine. The revolutionary warriors took these ideas on and pushed them forward, and in so doing were seduced by the call to unlimited response that such an escalatory logic demanded. For Lacheroy and his contemporaries the revolutionary war marked 'a step further, but an immense step in the direction of this total war towards which, alas, the world seems unavoidably to be heading.' 92 In a sense, the theory of revolutionary war took la paix-guerre to the colonies, by way of psychological warfare, with radicalized results. 90 Ibid, 771-774. 91 It is interesting to note that, a decade after the end of the Algerian War, Beaufre offered some thoughts on revolutionary warfare, although this took the form of a much broader synthesis of revolutionary wars from the Middle Ages onwards and was not concerned with the French army theory of guerre révolutionnaire. Beaufre was sensitive to the effect of revolutionary ideology on contemporary conflict, particularly where the transmission of propaganda both to the metropole and neutral countries was concerned. Holding tight to the importance of 'total strategy' as an appropriate response, he characterized revolutionary war as 'the modern form of war primitive war' and that such war 'which is limited on the materiel front Yet as this article has shown, whereas such developments may have in effect opened the door to political interventionism, the escalatory logic of the theory of revolutionary war gave adherents the impetus to walk through it. A certain concept of total war was at the heart of this.
Since the revolutionary war was being fought both abroad and at home, it was all but inevitable that the revolutionary warriors would come to hold that the 'proper indoctrination of the French nation was as important as indoctrinating colonial populations.' 95 The link they forged between colonial war and domestic security encouraged them to envisage their conflicts as national 93 The theory can also be understood as an appropriate response from a pre-nuclear army. As Kelly noted, there were 'precise psychological conditions that made the theory highly compatible with French national needs of morale and prestige': offering a justification for 'the formulation of strategies de-emphasizing the technical perfection of new weapons and statistical measurements of power […] It became a compliment to the French soldier and his military organization to proclaim this initiative as a specific national aptitude vis-à-vis the atom-intoxicated AngloSaxons.' Kelly, Lost Soldiers, 9-10. 94 Paret, French Revolutionary Warfare, 103-8. 95 A. Horne, The French Army and Politics, 1870 -1970 (London, 1984 , 76.
emergencies. The army needed to assert its stewardship over a people either ignorant of the ideological war in which they were embroiled, or already indoctrinated by an opposing ideology.
Thus Némo could argue that: 'As regards in particular the army and its cadres, their roots must thrust deep into the real country (pays réel) […] Through its army, just as through its politics, the country must be involved in the war; if not it becomes disinterested and this is the first step toward abandonment and defeat.' 96 Perceptive individuals saw that it was rather the politicization of the army that offered a first step towards defeat, and in this sense the logic of the theory was self-defeating. Paret's contemporary assessment was particularly astute. 'What effect might a military élite with a sense of mission, and a lack of trust in the reliability of its base, have on this base?' he asked:
If the French Army were a revolutionary force its first move, according to La Guerre Révolutionnaire, should be to conquer and secure this base. But the Army -whatever the opinions held by some of its members -is not really, in its essentials, revolutionary; and one may expect the doctrine eventually to break up over the contradiction of imposing revolutionary methods on non-revolutionary organizations.
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The decline of la guerre révolutionnaire -with the creation of a new Republic and the return of de
Gaulle -appeared to bear that out, even if the interventionist tendency would return a few short years later.
Nor was it the case that the army in its entirety was ever fully won over to theory. In this regard, an apocryphal remark attributed to de Gaulle is perhaps telling. When approached by a junior officer who attempted to engage him on the subject, the General retorted: 'I know of two types of warfare: mobile warfare and positional warfare. I have never heard of revolutionary 96 Némo, 'La Guerre dans le milieu social', 623. 97 P. Paret, 'The French Army', 69.
warfare.' 98 Although by now out of uniform, de Gaulle's sentiment may have been shared by many in service. Even during its ascendency as a training centre, reports emanating from the CIPCG at Arzew suggest that 'the minds of a great many cadres, officers and NCOs, were not very receptive, were indeed hostile, to psychological warfare.' 99 At the same time, as a staging post for those whose trajectories culminated in a rift with Republican government, the influence of the theory is undeniable. Serendipitous events rendered both Galula and Trinquier as centurions-manqués. 100 Lacheroy the theorist and Argoud the practitioner, meanwhile, received death sentences in absentia for their part in the April 1961 coup attempt. 101 Understanding the totality inherent in their conception of revolutionary war makes some sense of the path they chose.
In the words of Dennis Showalter: The most untidy fact was that the conceptualisation of war they had created did not correspond to the reality of the conflict in Algeria. Throughout the 1950s the revolutionary war theorists drew on a narrative of totality which did not end in 1945 but was reaching apotheosis in the post-Second World War wars of empire. Much like the Viet Minh's own efforts, such an unconventional concept of total war underscores Hew Strachan's contention that a 'total war need not be modern: a modern war need not be total.' 103 Here was a war which was, in many respects, de-technologized -a total war of mind rather than materiel. Yet it was a total war that existed in mind alone. In 1960 Paret observed that 'although modern war has blurred the dividing lines between internal and external operations, these still exist', thus laying bare the fantasy of the theory. 104 It was one thing for military personnel to mobilise for a subversive war below the nuclear horizon, but quite another to expect French civil society to mobilize for an existential struggle. The dynamic of war might be totalizing for the Vietnamese and the Algerians, but it simply was not so for the French. For France's revolutionary warriors, however, the intellectual barrier between limited and unlimited war had crumbled, giving way to a total war they perceived as immediate, urgent, and very real.
